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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Respondent, J Case No. 870434-CA 
v. : 
ANITA CUBA WALKER, : Category No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a conviction of exploiting 
prostitution, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. S 76-10-1305(1)(e) (1978). This Court has jurisdiction to 
hear the appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 
1989). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Whether sufficient evidence was presented at trial to 
sustain defendant's conviction for exploiting prostitution? 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The applicable statutes for a determination of this 
case are: 
Utah Code Ann. S 76-10-1301 (1978)i 
(2) -House of Prostitution" means a place 
where prostitution or promotion of 
prostitution is regularly carried on by one 
or more persons under the control, 
management, or supervision of another. 
Utah Code Ann. S 76-10-1304 (1978)t 
Aiding prostitution—(1). A person is guilty 
of aiding prostitution if he: 
(a) Solicits a person to patronize a 
prostitute; or 
(b) Procures or attempts to procure a 
prostitute for a patron; or 
(c) Leases or otherwise permits a place 
controlled by the actor, alone or in 
association with another, to be used for 
prostitution or the promotion of 
prostitution; or 
(d) Solicits, receives, or agrees to 
receive any benefit for doing any of the acts 
prohibited by this subsection. 
(2) Aiding prostitution is a class B 
misdemeanor, provided that a second 
conviction under this section shall be a 
class A misdemeanor. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1305 (1978)t 
Exploiting prostitution.—(1) A person is 
guilty of exploiting prostitution if he: 
(a) Procures an inmate for a house of 
prostitution or place in a house of 
prostitution for one who would be an inmate; 
or 
(b) Encourages, induces, or otherwise 
purposely causes another to become or remain 
a prostitute; or 
(c) Transports a person into or within 
this state with a purpose to promote that 
person's engaging in prostitution or 
procuring or paying for transportation with 
that purpose; or 
(d) Not being a child or legal dependent 
of a prostitute, shares the proceeds of 
prostitution with a prostitute pursuant to 
their understanding that he is to share 
therein. 
(e) Owns, controls, manages, supervises, 
or otherwise keeps, alone or in association 
with another, a house of prostitution or a 
prostitution business. 
(2) Exploiting prostitution is a felony of 
the third degree. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Anita Cuba Walker, was charged with 
exploiting prostitution, a third degree felony, in violation of 
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Utah Code Ann. S 76-10-1305(1)(e) (1978) (R. 10-11). On March 
26, 1986, a jury trial commenced before the Honorable Raymond S. 
Uno, Judge, Third Judicial District Court (R. 26, 135A, 132). On 
April 2, 1986, a verdict of guilty was returned (R. 30-31; R. 134 
at 80). On May 16, 1986, defendant was sentenced to the 
statutory term of zero to five years at the Utah State Prison. 
The sentence was stayed and defendant was placed on supervised 
probation for a period of eighteen months under specified terms 
and conditions (R. 114). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Beginning in 1978, defendant, Anita Cuba Walker, 
operated a message parlor called the Health and Herb Store in 
Salt Lake County (R. 135 at 24). Defendant was a licensed 
massage technician (R. 135 at 36). Throughout the period in 
question, defendant properly renewed her various business 
licenses (R. 135 at 24, 33-34). 
In February, 1985, defendant hired Debbie Shire (R. 135 
at 105). At the time, Debbie was convicted of a felony, forgery, 
and residing in the Residential Community Treatment Center (half-
way house) (R. 134 at 62; R. 135 at 46). When defendant hired 
Debbie, defendant told her that her job was to "give the hand 
jobs, the blow jobs, or the lay" (R. 135 at 108). Defendant told 
Debbie that she charged "$40 for a hand job and that she charged 
$60 for a blow job and $80 for a lay" (R. 135 at 108). From 
these amounts, defendant told Debbie that "on the $40 hand job, 
she was to get $20 and [Debbie] would keep $20 ... on the $60 
blow job, she was to get $25 and [Debbie] was to get $35 ... on 
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the $80 layr she was to get $35 and [Debbie] was to get $45" (R. 
135 at 111-12) • To Hkeep track of the different men that came in 
and what they had", defendant maintained a card file system (R. 
135 at 118). Defendant instructed Debbie that the cards were to 
be filled out with the name of the client, a brief physical 
description of the client, the date and nature of the sexual act 
performed, and the amount of money from the act retained by 
defendant (R. 135 at 108-10, 116, 133, 138). The sexual acts 
were not referred to by name on the cards but in code; Ma little 
4 ... would be for a hand job ... a slanted slash would be for a 
blow job ... a straight slash would be for a lay" (R. 135 at 
116). 
Debbie Shire remained employed by defendant as a 
prostitute until her arrest in mid-August, 1985 (R. 135 at 112; 
R. 134 at 32). Throughout these months, Debbie continued to work 
in the same manner as described in her first conversation with 
defendant in that after each act of prostitution, Debbie recorded 
the acts and information required in the card file system. 
Throughout this time, Debbie continued to share her earnings from 
prostitution with defendant as directed (R. 134 at 32). 
As Debbie described it, "[defendant] hired me to do 
acts of prostitution. ... That was the same job that I did the 
whole time" (R. 134 at 58). While usually the specific sexual 
act to be performed was left up to the client and Debbie, at 
times defendant told Debbie what sex act to perform with a 
particular customer (R. 134 at 60-61). Debbie also at times 
charged a customer either more or less than the prices set by 
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defendant (R. 134 at 61). But, whenever Debbie performed acts of 
prostitution, she gave part of the money to defendant (R. 134 at 
32). 
Because Debbie had to show legitimate employment to her 
supervisor at the halfway house, she applied for a license as 
masseuse, listing herself on the application as an employee of 
defendant's Health and Herb Store (R. 134 at 40). Additionally, 
defendant supplied Debbie with receipts and checks purportedly 
showing that Debbie rented space and equipment from defendant as 
a legitimate masseuse (R. 134 at 41). Debbie admitted that these 
were lies (R. 134 at 42). Her only work at defendant's 
establishment was as a prostitute (R. 134 at 32, 58). 
In addition to Debbie, defendant had at least three 
other employees at the Health and Herb Store. One was her son's 
nineteen year old girlfriend, Jenny, who worked in the office and 
did not do massages (R. 134 at 64-65). Another was Dorothy or 
Doris, a women in her fifties, who performed acupressure massages 
that did not involve sexual acts (R. 134 at 65-66; R. 135 at 49). 
A third was Suzi, a women in her early twenties, who performed 
"pleasure massagefs]" which consisted of sexual acts (R. 135 at 
49). 
On August 9, 1985, Gerald W. Chatelain, Jr., a 
correctional technician for the Department of Corrections, went 
to defendant's business. His purpose was to verify the nature of 
Debbie Shire's employment at the Health and Herb Store. This was 
part of his normal duties at the Residential Community Treatment 
Center where he worked (R. 135 at 46). 
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Mr. Chatelain arrived at defendant's at approximately 
9:45 p.m. and was greeted by defendant (R. 135 at 47-48). No one 
else was immediately present. As Mr. Chatelain entered, he 
hesitated, "trying to determine what type of business it was" (R. 
135 at 48). Defendant immediately asked, "Have you ever been in 
a massage parlor before?" (R. 135 at 48). When Mr. Chatelain 
said no, defendant said, "Well, we have two types of massages: 
one for relaxation and one for pleasure" (R. 135 at 48). 
Defendant continued to explain that the "relaxation massage" was 
basically an acupressure to relax the client and make him feel 
good. It would last approximately fifteen to twenty minutes. 
Afterwards, defendant told Mr. Chatelain he could have a 
"pleasure massage" (R. 135 at 48). 
Mr. Chatelain and defendant proceeded to another room, 
called the "red room" by defendant (R. 135 at 49). Two women 
identified as Doris and Suzi were present. Defendant told Mr. 
Chatelain that Doris would perform the "relaxation massage" and 
Suzi would do the "pleasure massage" (R. 135 at 49). At that 
point, Suzi nodded affirmatively in Mr. Chatelain's direction (R, 
135 at 92). Mr. Chatelain asked what a "pleasure massage" 
involved. Defendant responded, "Well, that could be either a 
hand job or a french, which is a blow job, as we call it, or [Mr. 
Chatelain] could get laid" (R. 135 at 49J.1 Defendant told Mr. 
Defendant asserts in her brief that Mr. Chatelain could not 
remember defendant's exact words to him (Br. of App. at 4). To 
the contrary, Mr. Chatelain testified that because he knew the 
significance of defendant's representations, he immediately wrote 
down the terms used upon leaving defendant's business (R. 135 at 
61-62). 
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Chatelain that the "relaxation massage" would cost $35 and the 
2 
"pleasure massage" would be $85 (R. 135 at 50). Mr. Chatelain 
pretended that his wallet was outside, left defendant's business 
and called the Sheriff's Office (R. 135 at 50-51). 
During the trial, approximately twenty of the file 
cards, described by Debbie Shire as maintained by defendant, were 
introduced into evidence. (Exhibits 2-B, 2-C, 2-E, 2-J, 8, 9, 
11, 13, 14, 17, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 27, 31, 35, 39; R. 135 at 
134-35, 140-47). These exhibits came from boxes sized from 
defendant's kitchen in the Health and Herb Store building 
pursuant to search warrant (Exhibits 2 and 2-A; R. 135 at 40, 
43). The validity of the seizure is not in question (R. 135 at 
41). Altogether, the boxes contained "a couple of hundred" 
similar cards (R. 134 at 50). However, based on the objections 
of defense counsel, the only cards specifically discussed were 
those in the handwriting of Debbie Shire (R. 132). Debbie Shire 
testified that each of the cards introduced contained information 
concerning the sex act performed by Debbie and the amount of 
money from the sex act retained by defendant. In some cases, 
defendant was present when Debbie filled out the cards. (R. 134 
at 54-56). But in all cases, Debbie only filled out the cards 
because defendant had told her to maintain the cards and 
information as part of the record keeping of defendant's business 
(R. 135 at 118; R. 134 at 32). 
Mr. Chatelain testified that the amount was $85 but conceded 
that the sheriff's report of his encounter said $80. Mr. 
Chatelain also testified that he may have testified at the 
preliminary hearing to $80 (R. 135 at 83-84). 
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Defendant presented no witnesses on her behalf (R. 134 
at 69). However, at the close of the evidence, defendant did 
move the trial court for a directed verdict of acquittal based on 
insufficient evidence (R. 134 at 76). The motion was denied (R. 
134 at 78-9). Additionally, defendant renewed her motion to 
dismiss the information which had been made and denied pretrial 
(R. 132; R. 134 at 78). Defendant argued that the misdemeanor 
statute of aiding prostitution, Utah Code Ann. S 76-10-1304(1)(c) 
(1978), covered the same criminal conduct as the felony charge of 
exploiting prostitution, Utah Code Ann. S 76-10-1305(1)(e) (1978) 
(R. 132 at 10-19). As such, defendant argued that she was 
entitled to either a dismissal of the information or a reduction 
of the charge to a misdemeanor (R. 132 at 11). The motion was 
denied (R. 134 at 78-9). 
Despite defendant's position that the charge should 
have been reduced to a misdemeanor, she did not seek any lesser 
included instruction to that effect (R. 134 at 72). Defendant's 
requested instructions were given, given as modified or given in 
substance (R. 134 at 72-3). Defendant made exceptions to some 
instructions, but not to the verdict form (R. 134 at 71-2, 74-5, 
96-97, 100). No issue is raised on appeal as to the jury 
instructions. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The evidence presented at trial, together with all 
reasonable inferences, is sufficient to sustain defendant's 
felony conviction of exploiting prostitution. 
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The felony statute of exploiting prostitution is not 
wholly duplicative of the misdemeanor statute of aiding 
prostitution; and, therefore, defendant is not entitled to a 
reduction of her conviction. 
Even assuming arguendo that the statutes were 
duplicative, the remedy would not be to wholly vacate defendant's 
conviction but to remand the case for resentencing of defendant 
under the misdemeanor statute and penalty. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL TOGETHER WITH 
ALL REASONABLE INFERENCES IS SUFFICIENT TO 
SUSTAIN DEFENDANT'S CONVICTION OF EXPLOITING 
PROSTITUTION. 
Defendant contends that the evidence adduced at trial 
is insufficient to support her conviction of exploiting 
prostitution as defined under Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1305(1) 
(1978) which reads: 
A person is guilty of exploiting prostitution 
if he: 
• • • 
(e) Owns, controls, manages, supervises, 
or otherwise keeps, alone or in association 
with another, a house of prostitution or a 
prostitution business. 
House of prostitution means: 
a place where prostitution or promotion of 
prostitution is regularly carried on by one 
or more persons under the control, 
management, or supervision of another. 
Utah Code Ann. S 76-10-1301(2) (1978).3 Prostitution is 
Utah Code Ann. S 76-10-1301 was amended in 1987 and 1988. 
Reference will be made to the 1978 definitions in effect at the 
time of defendant's trial. 
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statutorily defined in pertinent part as: 
engag[ing] or offer[ing] or agree[ing] to 
engage in any sexual activity with another 
person for a fee. 
Utah Code Ann. S 76-10-1302(1)(a) (1978). Sexual activity means: 
intercourse or any sexual act involving the 
genitals of one person and the mouth or anus 
of another person, regardless of the sex of 
either participant. 
Utah Code Ann. S 76-10-1301(1) (1978). Here, the jury was fully 
advised as to each requisite element of the offense. (See Court's 
Instructions to the Jury, Instructions 14-19; R. 86-91.) No 
4 
issue has been raised on appeal as to the instructions. 
The standard for review for a sufficiency of the 
evidence challenge is well-established by the Utah Appellate 
Courts. 
[T]he evidence and the reasonable inferences 
which may be drawn therefrom must be viewed 
in the light most favorable to the jury 
verdict. A jury conviction is reversed for 
insufficient evidence only when the evidence, 
so viewed, is sufficiently inconclusive or 
inherently improbable that reasonable minds 
must have entertained a reasonable doubt that 
the defendant committed the crime of which he 
was convicted. 
State v. Johnson, 774 P.2d 1141, 1147 (Utah 1989). Accord State 
v. Jamison, 767 P.2d 134, 137 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). Further, 
since a jury is in the best position to give proper weight to the 
peripheral nature of [any] contradictory testimony", State v. 
Without directly challenging any instruction, defendant 
claims that the jury was "confused" as to the elements required 
for conviction (Br. of App. at 23). Such is not the case. The 
jury while in deliberations did make a request of the court for 
clarification of an instruction. Before the court could tell the 
jury "to use their own judgment", the jury informed the court 
that they had "resolved that particular question" (R. 134 at 85). 
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Lactod, 761 P.2d 23, 28 (Utah Ct. App. 1988): 
It is not this court's duty to measure 
conflicting evidence or the credibility of 
witnesses. That responsibility belongs 
strictly to the trier of fact. 'It is the 
exclusive function of the jury to weigh the 
evidence and determine the credibility of the 
witnesses' . . . . So long as there is some 
evidence, including reasonable inferences, 
from which findings of all requisite elements 
of the crime can reasonably be made, [the 
court's] inquiry stops . . . . 
Id. at 27, quoting State v. Booker, 709 P.2d 342, 345 (Utah 1985) 
(citations omitted). Accord State v. Hopkins, 119 Utah Adv. Rep. 
59 (1989). 
Turning to the facts established at trial and their 
reasonable inferences, it is clear that defendant operated a 
massage parlor called the Herb and Health Store in Salt Lake 
County (R. 135 at 24, 33-4, 36). It is equally clear that 
beginning in February, 1985 and continuing through August 9, 
1985, defendant in addition to legitimate massages offered her 
clientele prostitution services (R. 134 at 32, 58; R. 135 at 46-
50, 108). Debbie Shire, under a grant of immunity, testified 
that she was hired exclusively as a prostitute by defendant (R. 
135 at 108). Not only did Debbie perform sexual acts for 
defendant's clients but did so at defendant's direction and with 
defendant's approval and knowledge (R. 134 at 32, 58). The 
general prices for the sexual acts were initially set by 
defendant even though Debbie did vary from the set prices on 
occasion (R. 135 at 108, 11-12; R. 134 at 61). Defendant also 
required Debbie to maintain a card file on the clients, including 
information on the sexual acts performed (R. 135 at 116-18). 
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Defendant required a set share of any monies received by Debbie 
for each sexual act (R. 135 at 111-12). 
The evidence of the cards themselves established the 
illicit nature of defendant's business. Defendant directed the 
cards to be maintained in code, Ma little 4 ... for a hand job 
... a slanted slash ... for a blow job ... a straight slash ... 
for a layM (R. 135 at 116). The cards not only tracked the 
clientele that participated in sexual activity but allowed for an 
accounting of defendant's share of the monies earned from the 
prostitution business (R. 135 at 133, 138). 
The direct control, management and supervision by 
defendant of her prostitution business was further established by 
Gerald Chatelain's encounter with defendant on August 9, 1985 (R. 
135 at 46-50). Immediately upon entering defendant's business 
and without knowing anything about its illicit nature, Mr. 
Chatelain was offered the services of another prostitute (R. 135 
at 47-49). It was defendant who initiated the offer, defendant 
who directed who would service Mr. Chatelain, both legitimately 
and illegitimately, and defendant who set the price to be charged 
(R. 135 at 49-50). 
Taken as a whole, the evidence clearly supports the 
jury's conclusion that defendant owned, controlled, managed or 
supervised a Mhouse of prostitution or prostitution business" in 
addition to any legal massage services she offered. It was 
defendant who established which employees would act as 
prostitutes. It was defendant who set forth the duties and 
procedures to be followed. Applying the proper standard of 
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review, the evidence is sufficient to sustain defendant's 
conviction of exploiting prostitution. 
POINT II 
DEFENDANT IS NOT ENTITLED TO HAVE HER 
CONVICTION VACATED AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
Defendant argues that even if she did commit the acts 
charged, she is entitled to have her conviction vacated on the 
grounds that her conduct is similarly covered by two statutes, 
one a felony and one a misdemeanor (Br. of App. at 21-26). 
Specifically, defendant contends that the misdemeanor offense of 
aiding prostitution, Utah Code Ann. S 76-10-1304(1)(c) (1978), is 
duplicative of the felony offense of exploiting prostitution, 
Utah Code Ann. S 76-10-1305(1)(e) (1978), of which defendant 
stands convicted. Further, defendant argues that since she did 
not ask for a lesser included instruction on the misdemeanor 
charge, this Court is precluded from reducing defendant's 
conviction or correcting her sentence (Br. of App. at 25-26). 
According to defendant, the only remedy if the statutes are 
viewed as duplicative is to vacate defendant's conviction 
entirely. Defendant's argument is not supported by the plain 
meaning of the statutes. 
Defendant was charged under subsection (e) of Utah Code 
Ann. S 76-10-1305(1) wherein a person is guilty of exploiting 
prostitution if he: 
Owns, controls, manages, supervises, or 
otherwise keeps, alone or in association with 
another, a house of prostitution or a 
prostitution business. 
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Prior to 1974, this language of subsection (e) of the exploiting 
prostitution statute was contained as a separate subsection in 
the misdemeanor aiding prostitution statute. All other current 
subsections of the aiding prostitution and exploiting 
prostitution statutes remained unchanged. However, in 1974, the 
Utah legislature amended the prostitution statute in conjunction 
with numerous other amendments to the then newly enacted 1973 
5 
Criminal Code. While no legislative history is available 
discussing the prostitution statute amendment, it is clear from 
the nature of the amendment itself that the Utah legislature 
determined that the type of conduct which had been classified as 
a misdemeanor previously should be classified as a felony. The 
amendment in effect deleted one method of violating the aiding 
statute by reclassifying that means of criminal conduct as a 
felony. As noted recently by the Utah Supreme Court, it is the 
legislature's prerogative to define the elements and degree of 
punishment for a criminal offense. State v. Moore, No. 870470, 
slip op. at 7, 12 (Utah, Oct. 25, 1989). 
Defendant attempts to overcome this Court's deference 
to the legislative function by claiming that the two statutes now 
punish the same conduct and therefore under State v. Shondel, 22 
Utah 2d 343, 453 P.2d 146 (Utah 1969), defendant is entitled to 
the lesser penalty (Br. of App. at 22-23). The State, both at 
trial and on appeal, recognizes that if the statutes do in fact 
The amendments were grouped together as H.B. 31. The tapes of 
the committee meetings on H.B. 31 are no longer available. The 
discussions at the time of passage of the bill are available. A 
review of those tapes does not reveal any discussion of the 
prostitution statute amendment. 
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punish the same criminal act, defendant as a matter of law should 
be subject only to the lesser punishment (R. 132 at 12). 
However, contrary to defendant's assertion, State v. 
Shondel does not stand for the general proposition that: 
where there is doubt or uncertainty as to 
which of two punishments is applicable to an 
offense, an accused is entitled to the 
benefit of the lesser. 
453 P.2d at 148 (Br. of App. at 22-23). Rather its holding is 
much narrower. As stated by the Utah Supreme Court: 
We held in State v. Shondel, 22 Utah 2d 343, 
435 P.2d 146 (1969), that if two statutes are 
wholly duplicative as to the elements of the 
crime, the law does not permit a prosecutor 
to exercise the wholly unfettered authority 
to decide whether the crime should be charged 
as a misdemeanor or a felony. 
State v. Bryan, 709 P.2d 257, 263 (Utah 1985) (emphasis added). 
Accord State v. Duran, 772 P.2d 982, 987 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) 
("the application of Shondel is limited to situations where the 
statutes at issue are 'wholly duplicative as to the elements of 
the crime'"). The issue then is whether the statutory 
definitions of aiding prostitution and exploiting prostitution 
"proscribe exactly the same conduct, i.e., do they contain the 
same elements?". State v. Gomez, 722 P.2d 747, 749 (Utah 1986). 
The two sections in question are subsection (e) of the 
exploiting prostitution statute under which defendant was 
convicted: 
A person is guilty of exploiting prostitution 
if he: 
(e) Owns, controls, manages, supervises, or 
otherwise keeps, alone or in association with 
another, a house of prostitution or a 
prostitution business; 
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Utah Code Ann. S 76-10-1305(1); and, subsection (c) of the aiding 
prostitution statute under which: 
A person is guilty of aiding prostitution if 
he: 
(c) Leases or otherwise permits a place 
controlled by the actor, alone or in 
association with another, to be used for 
prostitution or the promotion of 
prostitution. 
Utah Code Ann. S 76-10-1304(1). 
Initially, the sections appear to be very similar. 
Both require the joint action of two parties, a "manager" and a 
prostitute. Both require the defendant to actually know that 
prostitution is occurring. But then some differences become 
apparent. Utah Code Ann. S 76-10-1304(1)(c), the aiding 
prostitution statute, requires that a defendant have control of 
the place of the prostitution, but not necessarily of the 
prostitution itself. For example, a motel manager who allows a 
prostitute to rent a room, knowing that the room is being used 
for prostitution would be guilty of the misdemeanor of aiding 
prostitution. On the other hand, Utah Code Ann. S 76-10-
1305(1)(e), the felony statute, appears to require a defendant to 
be actively involved in the running of the prostitution business 
itself. The felony statute would cover the more criminally 
culpable conduct of being a "pimp" or "madam", as is the case 
here. As such, the legislative purpose in distinguishing between 
the penalties for the two statutes becomes clear. 
A prostitute acting alone could not be convicted under either 
statute. Rather, her conduct would be criminally punishable 
under Utah Code Ann. S 76-10-1302(1978); and, her customer's 
conduct under Utah Code Ann. S 76-10-1303 (1978). 
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The distinction between the elements of the two 
statutes becomes even sharper when all language of each 
subsection is considered. Utah Code Ann. S 76-10-1304(1)(c) 
prohibits the leasing or otherwise permitting of a place "for 
prostitution or the promotion of prostitution". Prostitution is 
defined under Utah Code Ann. S 76-10-1302 (1978) as being the act 
of engaging in sexual activity for a fee. Prostitution does not 
require a regular course of conduct. Rather, a single sexual act 
if done for money is sufficient. Thus, under the misdemeanor 
aiding prostitution statute a defendant may be convicted for 
permitting a single act of prostitution. Here, if the only 
evidence against defendant was her encounter with Gerald 
Chatelain, she would have only been guilty of aiding 
prostitution. 
Just as distinctly, Utah Code Ann. S 76-10-1305(1)(e) 
requires that before a person may be convicted of exploiting 
prostitution, it must be established that he controlled, managed 
or supervised a "house of prostitution or a prostitution 
business". A "house of prostitution" is defined as "a place 
where prostitution or promotion of prostitution is regularly 
carried on by one or more persons under the control, management, 
or supervision of another", Utah Code Ann. S 76-10-1301(2) (1978) 
(emphasis added). A single act of prostitution is insufficient 
for conviction. Instead, the State must show, as it did here, 
that the defendant was supervising a regularly conducted business 
of prostitution. (See Point I, supra, for discussion of 
sufficiency of evidence of exploiting prostitution.) 
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Therefore, State v. Shondel is inapplicable because 
the elements of the two statutes in question are not -wholly 
duplicative". Accord State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439 (Utah 1988) 
(sexual abuse of a child is not duplicative of sexual 
exploitation of a child); State v. Clark, 632 P.2d 841 (Utah 
1981) (theft of livestock is merely more specific and therefore 
separate crime from theft); State v. Kerekes, 622 P.2d 1161 
(Utah 1980) (theft by deception and deceptive business practices 
are distinct crimes); Helmuth v. Morris, 598 P.2d 333 (Utah 1979) 
7 (presenting a false prescription is not duplicitive of forgery). 
But, even if the statutes are considered duplicative, 
the remedy proposed by defendant is inappropriate. Defendant 
In interpreting these subsections, it is well to keep in mind 
that Utah does not follow the rule of strict construction. State 
v. Fontana, 680 P.2d 1042, 1046 (Utah 1984); Utah Code Ann. § 76-
1-106 (1978). Instead, Utah Appellate Courts have steadfastly 
recognized their primary duty in construing legislation is to 
determine and give effect to the legislative intent. Murray City 
v. Hall, 663 P.2d 1314, 1317 (Utah 1983); Bd. of Educ. of Granite 
School Dist. v. Salt Lake County, 659 P.2d 1030, 1033 (Utah 
1983); Christensen v. Industrial Commission, 642 P.2d 755, 756 
(Utah 1982). Consistent with this approach: 
Statutes are considered to be in pari materia 
and thus must be construed together when they 
relate to the same person or thing, to the 
same class of persons or things, or have the 
same purpose or object. If it is natural or 
reasonable to think that the understanding of 
the legislature or of persons affected by the 
statute would be influenced by another 
statute# then those statutes should be 
construed to be in pari materia, construed 
with reference to one another and harmonized 
if possible. 
Utah County v. Orem City, 699 P.2d 707, 709 (Utah 1985). Accord, 
Murray City v. Hall, 663 P.2d 1314, 1318; State v. Bishop, 753 
P.2d 439, 479-480. A statute must be interpreted and applied in 
light of its purpose, State v. Helm, 563 P.2d 794, 797 (Utah 
1977); and, accorded every presumption of validity, Timpanogos 
Planning v. Central Utah Water, 690 P.2d 562, 564 (Utah 1984). 
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argues that unless she requests a reduction, this Court is 
without authority to reduce her conviction and remand the case 
for appropriate resentencing as a misdemeanor (Br. of App. at 25-
26). Defendant claims that under State v. Bolsinger, 699 P.2d 
1214 (Utah 1985), a defendant's conviction may be reduced only if 
a defendant requests a lesser included instruction at trial or 
requests a reduction on appeal. Such is clearly not the law. An 
appellate court may reduce a conviction to a lesser included 
offense whenever the fact-finder would have necessarily found 
defendant guilty of the requisite elements of the lesser offense. 
State v. Bindrup, 655 P.2d 674 (Utah 1982). An appellate court 
may also reduce a conviction where, as here, defendant requests a 
new trial and admits in her appellate brief that the evidence if 
believed would constitute a violation of the lesser offense. 
State v. Devlin, 699 P.2d 717 (Utah 1985). Defendant's reliance 
on Utah Code Ann. S 76-1-402(5) (1978) is misplaced. The statute 
has never been interpreted to preclude post-conviction reduction 
absent a request of defendant. State v. Bolsinger, 699 P.2d 
1214, 1221. Rather, if defendant seeks to set aside her 
conviction, a reduction may be entered if consistent with the 
evidence at trial. 
Further, defendant's argument is logically 
inconsistent. For if, as a matter of law, exploiting 
prostitution is duplicative of aiding prostitution, then the jury 
necessarily found defendant guilty of both offenses, i.e., the 
elements would necessarily be "wholly duplicative1'. Defendant's 
conviction would stand but her punishment could only be the 
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lesser of the two statutes. Therefore, even accepting arguendo 
defendant's contention as to duplication, the proper remedy and 
the only remedy considered under State v. Shondel would be to 
remand the case for resentencing as a Class B misdemeanor. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, defendant's conviction and 
sentence for exploiting prostitution should be affirmed. 
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